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Australia
In Education and the Brain: A Bridge Too Far, John Bruer argues that, although current
neuroscientific findings must filter through cognitive psychology in order to be applicable
to the classroom, with increased knowledge the neuroscience/education bridge can
someday be built. Here, we suggest that translation cannot be understood as a single
process: rather, we demonstrate that at least four different ‘bridges’ can conceivably
be built between these two fields. Following this, we demonstrate that, far from being
a matter of information lack, a prescriptive neuroscience/education bridge (the one
most relevant to Bruer’s argument) is a practical and philosophical impossibility due
to incommensurability between non-adjacent compositional levels-of-organization: a
limitation inherent in all sciences. After defining this concept in the context of biology, we
apply this concept to the learning sciences and demonstrate why all brain research must
be behaviorally translated before prescriptive educational applicability can be elucidated.
We conclude by exploring examples of how explicating different forms of translation
and adopting a levels-of-organization framework can be used to contextualize and
beneficially guide research and practice across all learning sciences.
Keywords: neuroscience, psychology, education, translation, levels-of-organization, learning sciences
In 1997, John Bruer published Education and the Brain: A Bridge Too Far – a theoretical exposition
of neuroeducation that has proven seminal to the learning sciences (Bruer, 1997). In this piece,
Bruer cautions that the gap between neuroscientific research and educational practice is too wide
to traverse. However, he argues that this gap can be spanned by utilizing cognitive psychology as
an effective middle-ground: more specifically, neuroscience can be used to elucidate and guide
cognitive psychology, which, in turn, can be used to elucidate and guide education.
Interestingly, Bruer couches this argument in terms of a ‘dearth-of-information’ – suggesting
the major impediment to the actualization of neuroeducation is lack of knowledge. For instance,
Bruer notes “Neuroscience has discovered a great deal about neurons and synapse, but not nearly
enough to guide educational practice. Currently, the span between brain and learning cannot
support much of a load” (p. 15; emphasis ours). Similarly, Bruer states “Educational applications of
brain science may come eventually, but as of now neuroscience has little to offer teachers in terms
of informing classroom practice” (p. 4; emphasis ours). Whether he meant to convey a sense of
hope or was merely trying to temper the potentially controversial nature of his argument, Bruer’s
language gives the impression that, with enough knowledge, the bridge between neuroscience and
educational practice is achievable.
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Doubtless inspired by this language, many researchers in the
learning sciences have interpreted Bruer’s article as a challenge
to effectively link the brain to instructional practice (Szucs
and Goswami, 2007; Willingham and Lloyd, 2007; Samuels,
2009; Antonenko et al., 2014). Unfortunately, despite decades
of work, an effective neuroscience/education bridge remains a
frustrating chimera – and dogged pursuit of this goal has led to an
increase in the proliferation of the very ‘neuro-myths’ that Bruer
was cautioning against (Alferink and Farmer-Dougan, 2010;
Pasquinelli, 2012; Howard-Jones, 2014). In fact, so frustrated have
some neuroscientific researchers become, that a recent argument
has been put forward suggesting that failure to construct the
bridge is partly due to a lack of neuroscientific literacy amongst
educators (a point we will examine in more detail later in this
paper: (Devonshire and Dommett, 2010; Dekker et al., 2012;
Busso and Pollack, 2015).
In this article, we will re-visit Bruer’s argument: however, we
will present it not as a puzzle to be solved, but as a limitation
inherent in all fields of scientific inquiry. We will demonstrate
why, practically and philosophically, attempting to prescriptively
connect neuroscience and education (at least, education as it is
most commonly practiced) is not only hollow, but also irrelevant.
In addition, we will demonstrate that acceptance of this premise
can aid in the larger goals of the learning sciences by offering
a concrete and coherent framework through which to conceive
of, undertake, and effectively provide prescriptive translation of
research.
PRESCRIPTIVE, CONCEPTUAL,
FUNCTIONAL, AND DIAGNOSTIC
BRIDGES
Before beginning, it is important to note that there are at least
four different ‘bridges’ that can conceivably be built between
neuroscience and education: prescriptive, conceptual, functional,
and diagnostic. A prescriptive bridge attempts to specify practices
to be undertaken at the educational level on the basis of
evidence derived from the neurophysiologic level. In other words,
prescriptive translation aims to instruct an educator and learner
on what to do and how to do it.
A conceptual bridge allows for individuals to understand
or conceive of phenomena at the educational level through
theories generated at the neurophysiologic level. In other
words, conceptual translation allows educators and learners to
broaden their explanations for and interpretations of why certain
educationally relevant practices work – however, this type of
translation is silent on what said practices should or should not
entail. For instance, although some educators may be inspired
to use the concept of Hebbian-plasticity to justify the success or
failure of a specific lesson, this interpretation does not impact the
content, form, or efficacy of the lesson itself.
A functional bridge allows for phenomena at the
neurophysiologic level to constrain behaviors and cognitions
at the educational level. In other words, functional translation
allows for alterations of brain form and/or function to expand
or restrict the number and type of educationally relevant
practices an educator or learner can successfully undertake –
however, again, this type of translation is silent on what said
practices should or should not entail. For instance, if a learner
were to suffer damage to the visual cortex leading to blindness
(neurophysiologic), then any learning activities would be
unavoidably constrained to activities which do not rely on vision
(education). Of particular importance in this example, however,
is that damage to the visual cortex does not instruct the learner
as to which non-visual learning activities to undertake, how to
best undertake them, or how to measure their impact.
As the distinction between prescriptive and functional bridges
is somewhat subtle, it may be worthwhile to expand using a
specific example. Some students with attention disorders opt to
use pharmaceuticals to mitigate their symptoms and improve
educational performance. This performance is improved by
changing activity at the neural level. At first blush, the use
of a pharmaceutical may appear to be a prescriptive bridge.
However, a closer examination reveals that taking a pill constrains
an individual’s attentional networks thereby making them more
receptive to learning – but this does not engender learning itself.
Pharmaceuticals do not inform the educator or the student as to
which activities to use, how to use them, or how to measure them
in order to learn language, math, or geography. Accordingly,
pharmaceutical intervention represents a functional, rather than
a prescriptive, bridge.
Finally, a diagnostic bridge allows for cognitions and/or
behaviors at the educational level to be backward-mapped to
and correlated with phenomena extant at the neurophysiologic
level. In other words, diagnostic translation aims to describe
how a student is learning (or failing to learn) based upon
individual functional brain patterns – however, once again,
although this type of translation may inspire novel ideas for
learning interventions, it is silent on what these interventions
should entail and how they should be enacted. For instance, if
a learner was to demonstrate difficulty engaging with a reading
lesson (education), knowledge of his/her neuronal activation
patterns during reading activities (neurophysiologic) could be
utilized to potentially determine the underlying root/s of this
difficulty. Of importance, however, is that this knowledge does
not inform an educator or student on what to do to effectively
improve or otherwise alter said neuronal patterns.
As might be expected, the primary form of translation most
desired and expected by practicing educators is prescriptive
(Pickering and Howard-Jones, 2007; Hook and Farah, 2013).
As such, the main argument of this article centers around the
prescriptive bridge only. More specifically, we will be arguing that
findings at the neuroscientific level are irrelevant to and cannot be
prescriptively translated to classroom behaviors.
It is important to note that the conceptual, functional,
and diagnostic bridges are not only possible, but also already
exist across all levels of the learning sciences. With regards
to the conceptual bridge, educators and learners at all levels
are utilizing the neuroscientific paradigm to understand and
explain their current practices (Abiola and Dhindsa, 2012),
even though that framework has not directly instructed them
how to perform or measure the success of those practices.
With regards to the functional bridge, many educators and
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students consume pharmaceuticals or utilize electromagnetic
devices which modulate function at the neurophysiologic level
(McCabe et al., 2005; Pascual-Leone et al., 2012). These tools
typically expand the number of behaviorial and/or cognitive
practices a person can perform, even though they do not directly
instruct him/her as to which practices to perform, how to perform
them, or how to measure the success of each. With regards
to the diagnostic bridge, a number of individuals are utilizing
knowledge of individual neurophysiology to determine the root
causes of specific learning patterns, especially disabilities (Temple
et al., 2001). This information may inspire learning interventions,
though it does not dictate the parameters or content of said
interventions.
Again, throughout this piece we will not be arguing that
knowledge of neuroscience cannot influence conceptualization,
function, or diagnostic ability at the educational level – rather, we
will be arguing that it cannot be prescriptive at the educational
level.
REMEMBERING BRUER’S ARGUMENT:
TIME AND EFFORT
Bruer opens his article by outlining two major neurobiological
arguments prevalent in the 1990s used to support the case
for a neuroscience-guided education. First, he explores how
the concept of early-life (0–10 years) synaptogenesis influenced
the argument for critical periods: highly constrained time-
windows during which educators can (must) expose students
to specific experiences lest they fail to develop those skills
required to demonstrate educational success (pp. 5–9). Next,
he examines the concept of adolescent synaptic pruning and
research demonstrating that ‘enriched’ environments can temper
this pruning: an occurrence which suggests educators must
enhance sensorial aspects of the learning environment lest
students lose capacity to learn novel skills (pp. 9–10).
After outlining these arguments, Bruer demonstrates why
each are over-extended, largely misrepresented, and do not
prescriptively impact educational practice. With regards to
critical periods, he reveals that the basic neuroscientific research
exploring this concept has only ever been suggestive of critical
periods within basic sensory and motor systems, such as vision
or audition. As such, there is no evidence such periods exists
(nor any theories as to why they would exist) within larger
cognitive/behavioral systems required for success in educational
settings, such as reading and arithmetic skills. With regards to
‘enriched’ environments, he points out that every environment
containing a novel feature or activity can be considered
‘enriched’ and may temper synaptic pruning – regardless of
the type/amount of novelty and the age of the learner (adults
demonstrate a similar effect as younger students). Accordingly,
though intriguing, this notion offers no concrete or applicable
advice to educators beyond “don’t deprive students of novel
experiences.”
Bruer continues by demonstrating that neuroscientific
findings are more applicable to the field of cognitive (behavioral)
psychology; and that, in turn, cognitive psychology findings
are more applicable to education (pp. 11–15). For instance,
Bruer argues that, though neuroscientists can demonstrate the
time-course and evolution of synaptic growth and plasticity,
cognitive psychologists can demonstrate the time-course and
evolution of numerical competency. Though the former is
doubtless reflected in the latter, only the latter can engender
specific behaviors relevant and applicable to educators within the
modern classroom.
Interestingly, he concludes by leaving the reader with hope;
suggesting that failure to build the direct bridge between basic
neuroscience and education is due only to a lack of knowledge.
As outlined above, Bruer’s language implies it is only a matter of
time, effort, and information before the bridge can and will be
built.
REFRAMING BRUER’S ARGUMENT:
INCOMMENSURABLE
LEVELS-OF-ORGANIZATION
The continued absence of a prescriptive neuroeducation bridge
is not, as theorized by Bruer, due to a dearth of information –
rather, it is due to a feature common to and accepted in all
scientific fields: incommensurable levels-of-organization (Fodor,
1974, 1997; Rosenberg, 1994; Wimsatt, 1994; Rohrlich, 2004).
However, these terms are notoriously ambiguous in both the
philosophical and scientific literature – as such, it is important
we explicate how these terms will be used in this article.
Common conceptions of levels-of-organization within living
systems are compositional in nature (e.g., Oppenheim and
Putnam, 1958; Wimsatt, 1994; Kim, 1999). More specifically,
objects at each unique ‘level’ are thought to be composed of
material from the preceding level. For instance, within biology,
levels-of-organization typically progress accordingly:
Cell -> Tissue -> Organ -> Organism -> Population ->
Community -> Ecosphere -> Biosphere
As can be surmised, tissues are composed of cells; organs are
composed of tissues; etc. Accordingly, a foundational explication
of ‘levels-of-organization’ within living systems can be stated as a
step-wise increase of compositional material.
An important corollary of this type of organization is
emergence: a process whereby novel and coherent structures,
patterns, and/or properties arise at ascending levels that are
not exhibited within or predictable by preceding levels (for
discussion: Bedeau and Humphreys, 2008). For instance, the
unified size, shape, and functional coherence of an entire ant
colony cannot be explained or predicted by exploring the
behavior of an individual ant (Johnson, 2002). Accordingly,
‘levels-of-organization’ within living systems can be more
explicitly stated as a step-wise increase of compositional material
leading to emergent properties unpredictable by preceding levels.
To account for emergent properties at ascending levels, a series
of unique scientific fields and specialties have been developed
to explore and explain phenomena within each level – for
instance, cytologists are devoted to studying cells, histologists are
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devoted to studying tissues, etc. However, in order to successfully
undertake work, researchers at each level are necessarily required
to utilize a unique set of questions, definitions, tools, and success
criteria (Pavé, 2006). For example, when attempting to define the
infectious disease measles, researchers at the cellular level may use
crystallography to map proteins on the viral envelop to determine
the binding site of this virus to individual epithelial cell receptors
(Tahara et al., 2008), whilst researchers exploring this virus at the
organ level may use post-mortem gross pathology to characterize
the morphologic spread of viral driven necrosis within the lung
(Kaschula et al., 1983). Similarly, whereas researchers at the
tissue level may use an eyepiece micrometer to elucidate viral
infolding of varied lymphoid tissues (White and Boyd, 1973),
researchers at the population level may use aggregate survey and
medical record data to map the spread and prevalence of this
virus across a country (Santoro et al., 1984). Accordingly, ‘levels-
of-organization’ within living systems can be further refined to
mean a step-wise increase of compositional material leading to
emergent properties unpredictable by preceding levels requiring
unique language, tools, data, and success criteria to explicate.
Although, each of these above examples represents a valid
way to conceive of, define, and elucidate measles, it is clear
that each is unique and difficult to meaningfully correlate with
the others. For this reason (amongst others), the concept of
incommensurability was developed (Feyerabend, 1962; Kuhn,
1962). Incommensurability is perhaps best understood by laying
out three basic concepts (as derived from both Feyerabend and
Kuhn):
(1) Different paradigms are based upon different presumptions
concerning what scientific questions are ‘valid’ and about
what standards a solution needs to satisfy.
(2) The interpretation of observations is differentially influenced
by the assumptions of different paradigms.
(3) The vocabulary and methods used within each paradigm are
different: therefore, different paradigms cannot be compared
in any meaningful manner.
Though, this theory was largely developed to explain the
evolution of conceptual frameworks within specific scientific
domains, replacing the word ‘paradigm’ in the above concepts
with the word ‘levels’ reveals why work within each level is largely
independent from work in other levels. Researchers at each
level are necessarily required to utilize a unique set of questions
(presumptions), definitions (vocabulary), tools (methods), and
success criteria (solutions). For this reason, work at each level
can be understood as incommensurable with work at other levels.
However, it is worth pointing out that incommensurability is not
the same as incomparability. Oftentimes, the varied languages
and methodologies utilized at different levels will spring from
the same coherent environmental references (e.g., germ-theory
of disease) and explore the same topic (e.g., measles). Therefore,
work between layers may be compared and will often prove non-
contradictory (in fact, comparability gives rise to the conceptual
bridge outlined earlier in this piece).
In summary, we refer to ‘ levels-of-organization’ in a
living system as a step-wise increase of compositional material
leading to emergent properties unpredictable by preceding levels
requiring unique language, tools, data, and success criteria
to explicate. Furthermore, adopting the traditional definition
generated by Feyerabend and Kuhn (for review: Oberheim
and Hoyningen-Huene, 2009), we hold that unique levels-of-
organization are incommensurable in that they utilize different
presumptions, vocabularies, methods, and solutions.
PRESCRIPTIVE TRANSLATION
BETWEEN INCOMMENSURABLE
LEVELS-OF-ORGANIZATION
The utilization of incommensurable methodologies and analyses
within each level imposes limitations on prescriptive translation
between levels. More specifically, in order to prescriptively
translate between adjacent levels, one must adopt a number
of assumptions. Returning to measles – it is conceivable that
knowing how the virus binds to a single epithelial cell may be
of some use to someone attempting to track cellular-membrane
fusion within epithelial tissue (made up of 1000s of individual
epithelial cells). However, until one is able to simultaneously
measure activity within each individual cell within a larger
tissue, assumptions must be made in order for the former to
influence the latter: such as, that the behavior of individual
cells will not drastically change amongst millions of competing
cells, that the global extracellular environment of a tissue is
not drastically different from that of an isolated cell, that the
structural properties of a tissue will not greatly impact the
prevalence or function of membrane receptors, and so on.
Certainly the translation between non-adjacent levels becomes
increasingly precarious as the number and gravity of assumptions
compound – however, more importantly, due to the emergence
of unique and irreducible properties at ascending levels-
of-organization unpredicted by preceding levels, translation
between non-adjacent organizational levels is often devoid of any
prescriptive utility (Atlan, 1993; Mazzocchi, 2008). For instance,
researchers focused on elucidating the workings of an individual
cell do not concern themselves with novel properties that emerge
when 1000s of cells work in tandem to form a tissue (e.g.,
permeability, contractibility, mineralization, etc.). However, it is
precisely these emergent properties that may influence researchers
interested in the process by which many different tissues combine
and interact to form an organ. Similarly, properties irrelevant
to and unpredictable by the study of unique tissues that emerge
only when exploring a complete organ (e.g., structure, function,
chemical production, etc.) are precisely those properties that
may prove influential to researchers interested in the process by
which many different organs combine and interact to form an
organism.
Returning once more to the example of measles, although the
importance of viral binding within a single epithelial cell may
be of use for someone interested in understanding how measles
present within larger epithelial tissue, the prescriptive importance
of this knowledge for someone interested in how measles present
across the entire skin (made up of 1000s of different types of
cells) is less clear. Continuing to higher organizational levels,
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the prescriptive importance of viral binding within a single
cell is even less clear to someone interested in the effect of
measles across the entire nervous system (organ system), the
entire human body (organism), or an entire country of human
bodies (population). Of prescriptive importance to researchers
at each organizational level are those unique properties which
emerge only at the immediately preceding level (Huneman,
2008). For instance, the researcher interested in how measles
presents across the skin may be influenced by the effects and
emergent properties of measles on the dozens of tissues that
constitute the skin.
Interestingly, it is in this pattern we discover how non-
adjacent levels can prescriptively interact: via translation through
intermediary levels. More specifically, research at the cellular level
may influence research at the tissue level (with the acceptance
of certain assumptions), whilst research at the tissue level
may influence research at the organ level (again, with certain
assumptions), etc. As such, although attempting to build a
prescriptive bridge between the cellular and organ levels may be
futile, prescriptive bridges can be built over the cellular/tissue and
tissue/organ gaps.
Although, this may appear obvious, it is extremely important
to make this idea clear: when attempting to prescriptively
connect non-adjacent levels-of-organization, one must always
and completely traverse each intermediary level. It is only
through translation of an object or concept into the novel
languages, tools, methods, and data at adjacent levels that
emergent properties can be accounted for and ideas from non-
adjacent levels can tentatively interact.
LEVELS-OF-ORGANIZATION IN THE
LEARNING SCIENCES
Once we understand that prescriptive bridges can only be
meaningfully built between adjacent levels-of-organization, the
reasons for the continued absence of the neuroeducation
bridge become clear. Specifically, cognitive/behavioral (c/b)
neuroscience is separated from education by an intermediate
level-of-organization: c/b psychology (Table 1). As such, the
behavioral properties that emerge at the c/b psychology level
which are required for prescriptive translation to the educational
level are non-extant in, non-predictable by, and largely irrelevant
to c/b neuroscientific research. For instance, it makes little
sense to talk about ‘reading’ as an isolated function within c/b
neuroscience as there is no single part of the brain that ‘reads’
(Dehaene, 2009). Although, it does makes sense to discuss the
function and connectivity of the mechanistic foundations of
reading in the brain (e.g., auditory phonemic discrimination,
visual letter recognition, semantic identification, etc.), reading
as a unitary, measurable, and meaningful skill only emerges
as an integrated behavioral set at the c/b psychology level
(Coch, 2010). Again, this is not to say the foundations for
educationally relevant skills do not exist in the brain – but,
just as speed is not a property of any individual component
of a car but emerges only with the effective integration of
all components, so too do larger behaviors sets emerge and
obtain meaning only following cumulative integration. This is
why Bruer’s argument that brain science must pass through
psychology in order to have incur relevance to education (at
least, education as it is currently understood and practiced) is
valid.
For example, c/b neuroscience researchers interested in
mapping language to specific areas of the brain will first
decompose language into its many constituent parts (e.g.,
verb comprehension), develop highly artificial tasks meant to
isolate a single constituent part (e.g., listen to a computerized
word-list consisting of 100 unrelated, context-free verbs), and
indirectly measure brain activity during task performance
in a highly controlled environment (for review: Vigliocco
et al., 2011). Although, it is possible to see how this type of
work may influence researchers interested in determining
how the constituent parts of language integrate to form
a complete, emergent behavioral ‘language’ set at the c/b
psychology level, a number of unproven assumptions must be
accepted: such as that neural regions measured in isolation will
behave in a similar manner when integrated with competing
networks, that isolated behavioral functions will remain
relatively stable when combined with secondary functions,
that environmental influences will not drastically change
the activation or function of specific nuclei, etc. (Chomsky,
1995).
When translating findings from c/b neuroscience directly
to education, not only do the number and gravity of
assumptions compound, but prescriptive utility evaporates. As
noted, the decomposition of language, development of an
artificial linguistic task, and indirect measurement of brain
activity in a highly controlled environment are required
in order to accomplish the goals of c/b neuroscientific
elucidation. However, this process necessarily strips language
of any meaning and ignores the influence of any competing
neural and/or environmental factors: the very things one
must understand in order to prescriptively influence linguistic
classroom learning (Gibbons, 2002). Luckily, these factors
emerge at the b/c psychology level with the recombination of
isolated behaviors into behavioral sets and the elucidation of
behavioral/environmental interactions.
For example, how does knowing that visually processing the
letter “M” requires activation of neurons within the occipital
lobe impact a lesson plan concerned with teaching students
how to read? More important in this instance is the knowledge
that reading ability is predicated upon (amongst other things)
the effective integration of visual identification and phonemic
discrimination: two larger behavioral sets understood and
elucidated using paradigms developed at the c/b psychology
level (Chall, 1996). Similarly, of what use is the knowledge that
verb generation requires the activation of motor neurons to
someone interested in helping a group of students learn how
to speak French? Again, more important in this scenario is the
knowledge that learning a novel language requires (amongst
other things) the integration of object recognition and conceptual
mapping: two larger behavioral sets understood and elucidated
using paradigms developed at the c/b psychology level (Barsalou
et al., 2003).
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PRESCRIPTIVE TRANSLATION IN THE
LEARNING SCIENCES
To see how this proposed framework leads to effective
prescriptive translation in the learning sciences, it is perhaps
best to start with a theoretical example. Above, we noted
that evidence from c/b neuroscience suggests that the motor
cortex demonstrates enhanced activation during verb generation
(Grezes and Decety, 2001). From this, one could propose that
the performance of relevant actions during novel verb generation
may enhance language learning (interestingly, this practice has
been utilized in classrooms since, at least, the late 1800s – but,
for our purposes, we will continue as though it were novel:
Gouin, 1892). At first blush, this suggestion may appear as a
valid prescriptive translation: in fact, one could easily imagine the
headlines heralding this pronouncement: “Movement Activates
the Brain and Improves Student Language Learning.”
A closer examination, however, reveals that this is an idea
which describes no constraints, parameters, or demonstrated
efficacy. Although, motor cortical activation might suggest a
link between movement and verb-learning, the specific type,
form, content, and schedule of any relevant learning activities
remains uncertain. Are all verbs and/or verb-tenses amenable
to movement-based learning improvements? Would movement
impact verb-learning in more complex and valid linguistic
contexts? Would the interaction of multiple agents within a
classroom setting impact movement practices and/or efficacy?
Furthermore, each of these lingering questions – the back-bone
for effective prescriptive utility (as each addresses the question
of ‘what to do’) – ignores the most obvious unknown: does
motor cortical activation even confer any impact on verb learning
whatsoever?
Accordingly, rather than jump straight from neurophysiology
to the classroom, prescriptive translation must first traverse
c/b psychology, where integrated linguistic behaviors emerge
and the relationship between motor cortical activation and
language-learning can be systematically explored. It is here
that researchers can determine how individuals come to
understand verbs in context (Hamblin and Gibbs, 1999),
link meaning between observed, performed, and linguistic
forms of actions (Gleitman, 1990), generate novel verbs
or verb-forms to shifting scenarios (Arad, 2003), etc. In
other words, via c/b psychology, the constituent parts of
language can be recombined to develop a more cohesive
theory of how the integrated behavioral properties of language
emerge whilst determining functional parameters for the
influence of motor cortical activity on different stages of this
process.
Although, prescriptive utility for teachers may begin to
emerge at the c/b psychology level, additional work undertaken
at the educational level within more ecologically-valid settings
is still required to account for properties that emerge when
learning takes place in an ecologically-valid classroom setting.
At this stage, the impact of group dynamics (Cole, 1970),
inter-personal communication (Savignon, 1991), feedback
(Nicholas and Lightbown, 2001), and other factors influencing
the efficacy of intentional teaching and learning of a language
can be determined. It is from this work that prescriptive
frameworks, protocols, and/or tools can be meaningfully
developed to impact teaching and learning practices (with
the understanding that variations will necessarily occur
according to specific classroom environments and learning
goals).
Moving to a real-world example, several researchers have
recently suggested that utilizing an ‘uncertain reward’ paradigm
during educational activities may improve classroom learning
(Howard-Jones, 2011; Ozcelik et al., 2013). These authors report
that this idea springs from work done at the c/b neuroscience
level: more specifically, it has been demonstrated that reward
uncertainty leads to both an increase in dopaminergic activity
within the mid-brain and enhanced anticipatory focus (Critchley
et al., 2001; Fiorillo et al., 2003).
As before, although an interesting idea, these neuroscientific
concepts do not confer any prescriptive actions or parameters
teachers or students can utilize, nor does it guarantee efficacy at
the educational level. Again, one could easily the see sensational
headlines for this idea (“Uncertain Rewards Boost Dopamine and
Improve Student Learning”), but emergent properties integral to
education simply have not been accounted for at this stage.
Therefore, rather than jumping straight into the classroom,
these researchers next incorporated ideas derived from over
a century of work done at the c/b psychological level.
It was through this body of work exploring the interplay
between engagement, motivation, and risk that it became
clear behavior arising from reward uncertainty is highly
influenced by goals and context. Accordingly, uncertain reward
do not universally enhance engagement; rather, this works
only when an individual determines the subjective context-
relevant risk/reward ratio is beneficial (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). Furthermore, when the importance of
outcome is elevated above process, uncertain rewards reduce
motivation and engagement (Shen et al., 2015). Again, these
parameters emerge only when larger behavioral sets (those
non-extant in the brain as isolated functions) are explored.
As stated by neuroscientist Wolfram Schulz, “There are no
dedicated receptors for reward. . .[therefore] functions of reward
cannot be derived entirely from physics and chemistry of input
events but are based primarily on behavioral effects, and the
investigation of reward functions requires behavioral theories
that can conceptualize the different effects of reward on behavior”
(Schultz, 2006; p. 91).
Finally, in order to account for the properties which emerge at
the educational level, these researchers moved to the classroom
where they conducted a 5-stage design-based study (Howard-
Jones et al., 2015). As can be expected, during this process
a number of issues unpredictable and irrelevant to the c/b
psychology level emerged: for instance, issues of cognitive-
load amongst teachers (divided between reward-schedules and
teaching), asymmetric engagement between peer groups, and
socially-driven emotional reactions. Through this work, the
authors were able to iteratively design an engaging and effective
learning tool: an excellent example of the prescriptive process
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engaging with and accounting for emergent properties at
preceding levels of organization.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF LEARNING
DISABILITIES
To date, the majority of neuroscience work commonly cited
as ‘successfully translated’ into the educational sphere concerns
learning disabilities. More specifically, the delineation of the
neural mechanisms that constitute larger behavioral sets and
the ability to measure functional brain activity have allowed
researchers to determine the underlying pathology behind varied
forms of learning difficulties. Once the underlying source of a
dysfunction is localized, relevant and effective remediation can
be commenced.
Although, this process may appear to be prescriptive between
education and neuroscience, a closer examination reveals
this to be a form of diagnostic translation (with prescriptive
elements between neuro and psych). More specifically, though
understanding the underlying neural reasons why a student is
unable to engage with a specific skill within a classroom may lead
to effective remediation ideas, it does not generate any specific
actions to be undertaken nor does it speak to the potential efficacy
of those actions. Furthermore, the concept of ‘remediation’ is not
the same as the concept of ‘learning.’ The goal of remediation is to
eliminate any underlying block or barriers impeding a student’s
ability to engage with learning tasks – however, this process is
moot on the larger process of the learning-tasks themselves. For
this reason, remediation activities are typically undertaken at an
individual psychological (rather than a social educational) level.
As an example, hypoactivation of both frontal and left
temporal brain regions relevant for phonological processing have
been implicated in dysphonetic dyslexia (Temple et al., 2001).
This knowledge has led several researchers to create intervention
programs that may successfully correct this abnormal neural
activity (though, the parameters for these programs were
necessarily elucidated, tested, and established at the psychological
level: Simos et al., 2002; Gaab et al., 2007). Although, this
is an excellent example of prescriptive interplay between the
neuropshysiologic and psychologic levels, it is important to note
that remediation of phonological processing does not confer the
ability to read. Once neural activity is more reflective of ‘neuro-
typical’ patterns, a student with learning disabilities is simply
better-positioned to engage with the process of learning to read
at the educational level – remediation does not obviate the need
to undertake the learning process. It is correct to argue that
understanding the underlying neural processes behind reading
and reading disabilities can inspire more effective learning
activities (beyond remediation) – however, once this process
commences, the earlier discussions of prescriptive translation
become relevant.
A similar pattern can be seen in work done with dyscalculia.
Recently, researchers have determined that one form of
dyscalculia can be driven by abnormal development of or activity
within the bi-hemispheric intraparietal sulci (Price et al., 2007) –
areas of the brain linked to numerosity (Pinel et al., 2001; Castelli
et al., 2006). As before, this knowledge has led to the development
of intervention programs aimed at helping individuals connect
quantities with the words and/or symbols that represent them
(elucidated, tested, and established at the psychological level:
Butterworth and Yeo, 2004; Butterworth and Laurillard, 2010).
As before, these intervention programs serve to remedy an
underlying issue thereby allowing a student to more effectively
engage with mathematical learning activities – but it does not
speak to those activities themselves. Again, it is correct to argue
that understanding the mechanistic foundations of numeracy
and dyscalculia can inspire more effective learning activities
(beyond remediation) – however, once this process commences,
the prescriptive translation framework becomes relevant.
HOW DOES THIS HELP LEARNING
SCIENCE RESEARCHERS?
The largest implication of incommensurable levels-of-
organization for researchers within the learning sciences is
the elucidation of a clear prescriptive translational path. Over
the last decade, large amounts of time and resources have been
spent trying to argue for the relevance and creation of the
bridge between non-adjacent levels; however, if we collectively
acknowledge that this is practically and philosophically irrelevant
(within all fields of science), we can re-direct this energy toward
solidifying the bridges between adjacent levels. For instance,
rather than attempting to deeply understand the vicissitudes of
neuroscience and education, researchers interested in translation
can focus their efforts, instead, on mastering neuroscience and
psychology, or psychology and education: for it is between these
adjacent levels that meaningful, prescriptive translation can take
place.
In addition, researchers within individual levels can (and
should) no longer feel pressured to prescriptively apply their
work beyond adjacent levels, as this practice serves only to
create overly-simplified models which may, in turn, evolve into
neuro-myths. As a concrete example, many c/b neuroscientists
have attempted to draw a parallel between neuroplasticity and
classroom practice (Sylwester, 1986; Brown and Wheatley, 1995;
Abiola and Dhindsa, 2012). More specifically, many utilize
evidence of neuronal re-wiring during post-stroke rehabilitation
as an argument for the link between neuroscience and learning
(Murphy and Corbett, 2009; Abiola and Dhindsa, 2012). At
first blush, this argument may appear strong; however, a closer
examination reveals it to be devoid of any true prescriptive
value. Rehabilitation consists of the continual repetition of simple
behaviors with the hopes of restoring larger behavioral sets (e.g., a
post-stroke victim may repeat a list of simple nouns for weeks-on-
end in order to improve global linguistic function: Gresham et al.,
1997). Of importance here is the return of behavioral function:
how this function is mirrored in the brain, although interesting,
is of no consequence to the larger therapeutic goals. Would we
consider it a failure if, after rehabilitation, a stroke victim regained
language function without demonstrating neural re-wiring? Of
course not. Accordingly, the relevance of rehabilitation to
education is not in neuroplasticity (neuroscience); rather, it
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is in the knowledge that the repetition of specific behaviors
can be utilized to improve larger, more integrated behavioral
sets (c/b psychology): the neural mechanisms underpinning
that rehabilitation or learning is prescriptively irrelevant and
uninformative to the practitioner at this higher level.
Finally, the elucidation of levels-of-organization may also
prove beneficial to the organization of science of learning labs and
journals. For instance, in order to guide prescriptive translation,
larger mind/brain/education labs may consider organizing space
so as to ensure those researchers at adjacent levels are in more
direct contact than those at a non-adjacent levels. Similarly,
science of learning themed journals may opt to organize articles
according to the organizational levels. This practice may help
researchers and practitioners at all levels quickly and easily locate
relevant articles from their own and adjacent levels.
HOW DOES THIS HELP EDUCATORS?
Several learning science theorists have recently argued that
educators require greater neuroscientific literacy and that
neuroscience should be included in pre-service training
(Devonshire and Dommett, 2010; Dekker et al., 2012; Busso
and Pollack, 2015). Although, knowledge of the brain is
certainly exciting and may inspire some teachers to develop
novel concepts or theories to explain classroom behavior, the
levels-of-organization framework reveals that prescriptive
utility (what to do in the classroom) will never spring from
this knowledge. As such, it should be made clear to educators
that they need not understand the structure and function of
the brain in order effectively perform their jobs. Again, this is
not to say knowledge of the brain is useless in the classroom
setting (as it confers opportunities for conceptual, functional,
and diagnostic translation) – this is merely to say that said
knowledge is not required to successfully perform and evolve
the duties of education. For this reason, although interested
educators should certainly be encouraged to learn more about
the brain (potentially supported by elective courses offered
during preservice years), non-interested educators should not
feel pressured into learning information that will ultimately
not directly impact the essential skills and practices required to
succeed in their chosen profession.
Beyond a call for neuroscientific literacy, educators are being
bombarded with programs and activities designed ‘with the
brain in mind.’ Products like Luminostiy, IMPACT, Brainology,
and CogMed are marketed as being brain-based, and educators
interested in using them must concern themselves with issues
of neural modularity and neuroplasticity. However, a closer look
reveals that even these programs cannot avoid following a step-
wise trajectory through the relevant levels-of-organization. For
instance, CogMed may reorganize neuronal structures, but it does
so only through the application and repetition of psychologically
derived behavioral patterns. Of importance to educators is not
whether these behavioral patterns scale-down to brain change,
but whether they scale-up to more general, educationally relevant
behavioral sets and outcomes. As such, educators need not
worry about claims made regarding the ‘brain-based’ nature
of a program; rather, they need only concern themselves with
claims made regarding behavioral activities and educationally
transferable outcomes of a program.
Again, some theorists argue enhanced neuroscience literacy
amongst educators will help inoculate teachers against these
types of programs (Goswami, 2006; Howard-Jones, 2014) –
however, this remedy is short-sighted and misses the ultimate
point. ‘Brain-based’ learning is not the first trend to sweep
through education, nor will it be the last; as such, insisting
teachers are proficient in the knowledge required to assess the
scientific veracity of claims made by product designers will
be a Sisyphean task. For instance, there is already discussion
of a ‘gene-based’ education (Asbury and Plomin, 2014): does
this mean teachers must next become literate in genetics?
How about when personalized tutoring-systems emerge: much
teachers then learn Artificial Intelligence algorithms? Rather
that asking already overly-busy teachers to obtain more
knowledge, the levels-of-organization framework clarifies that
teachers need only obtain the right knowledge. In these
instances, educational trends can be effectively and successfully
addressed by ensuring teachers focus only on the evidence
that matters most to their practice: more specifically, how
does a program impact the learning of students within my
particular educational setting? This inquiry makes obsolete any
facts that do not take into account the emergent properties
relevant to education (e.g., facts about the brain function,
genetic coding, computational scripts, etc.). Furthermore,
ensuring teachers focus their inquiries on practically relevant
information may inspire the designers of learning products
to obtain and deliver data more meaningful for their target
audience.
Taking this concept further, it is conceivable that within
the next decade engineers will develop a portable interface
capable of measuring and analyzing brain activity on the fly
(indeed, many companies already advertise prototypes of such
devices). Even if one were to use this interface to develop
an educational program that adapts to a student’s unique
neural patterns, this would be as hollow as current brain-
based programs. As before, in this instance, brain activity is
not guiding education – it is merely guiding sets of behaviors
that may scale-up to relevant educational outcomes. Again,
the efficacy of this program would not be measured in brain-
waves or brain change; rather, it would be measured in the
transfer of the skill/s obtained via repetition of behaviors to
the larger behavioral goals of education. Explicit knowledge
of brain function and change does not obviate the need for
proper competence, comprehension, and transfer as elucidated
using behavioral measures. This becomes especially clear when
one remembers that functional neural markers obtained at
the c/b neuroscience level are necessarily reliant on the
deconstruction of behaviors into constituent parts devoid of
integrative meaning. Until such a time as information and
skills can be directly uploaded into a student’s brain (at which
point, education as we currently know it will likely cease
to exist) neuroscientific measures must always pass through
the intermediary behavioral level in order to be prescriptively
relevant to education.
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A BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE
Since Bruer first put forth his neuroeducation argument,
there has been tremendous debate amongst researchers and
practitioners concerning the merits of translating brain
knowledge for classroom use. However, until now, very little
has been done to clearly define what is meant by translation.
This uncertainty, no doubt, has fueled this debate and obfuscated
attempts to determine what can and can not be meaningfully
expected from a union between neuroscience and education.
Through our explication of four different types of translation,
it is clear that neuroscience and education are already linked
via conceptual, function, and diagnostic bridges. Through, these
forms of translation, dialog amongst educators is evolving,
understanding of the holistic learning process is emerging, and
options to measure and modulate neurophysiology within both
typical and dysfunctional learners is expanding. However, it is
also clear that neuroscience cannot prescribe practices within
education except via psychology as this is the only means
by which to elucidate and account for emergent properties at
ascending levels of organization.
Once it is accepted that the prescriptive neuroscience/
education bridge is a chimera, all the time, resources, and energy
spent on trying to actualize it can be re-distributed to more
fruitful prescriptive translational avenues: specifically, to the c/b
neuroscience : c/b psychology and c/b psychology : education
junctions. Within this framework, any theoretical over-extension
can easily be identified and qualified prior to the emergence of
new neuro-myths. In addition, much pressure will be removed
from educators with regards to what concepts they are expected
to understand and utilize within the classroom: specifically,
any claim beyond behavioral enactment and measurement is
irrelevant.
As with any novel scientific endeavor, it is important to
establish a fundamental framework so as to beneficially guide
development and application into the future. We believe the
delineation of different forms of translation and explication
of the brain/behavior/classroom bridge required for effective
prescriptive translation provides the strongest support as we
continue to advance our work and will, ultimately, lead to
faster and more successful prescriptive translation between the
laboratory and the classroom.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Both JH and GD conceptualized, produced, and edited this
article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
ARC-SRI: Science of Learning Research Centre (project number
SR120300015).
REFERENCES
Abiola, O. O., and Dhindsa, H. S. (2012). Improving classroom practices using our
knowledge of how the brain works. Int. J. Environ. Sci. Educ. 7, 71–81.
Alferink, L. A., and Farmer-Dougan, V. (2010). Brain-(not) based
education: dangers of misunderstanding and misapplication of
neuroscience research. Exceptionality 18, 42–52. doi: 10.1080/09362830903
462573
Antonenko, P. D., van Gog, T., and Paas, F. (2014). “Implications of
neuroimaging for educational research,” in Handbook of Research on
Educational Communications and Technology, eds J. M. Spector, M. D. Merrill,
J. Elen, and M. J. Bishop (New York, NY: Springer New York).
Arad, M. (2003). Locality constraints on the interpretation of roots: the case
of Hebrew denominal verbs. Nat. Lang. Linguist. Theory 21, 737–778. doi:
10.1023/A:1025533719905
Asbury, K., and Plomin, R. (2014). G is for Genes: The Impact of Genetics on
Education and Achievement. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Atlan, H. (1993). Enlightenment to Enlightenment: Intercritique of Science and
Myth. New York, NY: SUNY Press.
Barsalou, L. W., Simmons, W. K., Barbey, A. K., and Wilson, C. D.
(2003). Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific
systems. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 84–91. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)0
0029-3
Bedeau, M. A., and Humphreys, P. E. (2008). Emergence: Contemporary Readings
in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brown, D. L., and Wheatley, G. H. (1995). Models of Neural Plasticity and
Classroom Practice Meeting of International Group for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education. Columbus, OH: ERIC.
Bruer, J. T. (1997). Education and the brain: a bridge too far. Educ. Res. 26, 4–16.
doi: 10.3102/0013189X026008004
Busso, D. S., and Pollack, C. (2015). No brain left behind: consequences of
neuroscience discourse for education. Learn. Media Technol. 40, 168–186. doi:
10.1080/17439884.2014.908908
Butterworth, B., and Laurillard, D. (2010). Low numeracy and dyscalculia:
identification and intervention. ZDM 42, 527–539. doi: 10.1007/s11858-010-
0267-4
Butterworth, B., and Yeo, D. (2004). Dyscalculia Guidance. London: NFER-Nelson.
Castelli, F., Glaser, D. E., and Butterworth, B. (2006). Discrete and analogue
quantity processing in the parietal lobe: a functional MRI study. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103, 4693–4698. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0600444103
Chall, J. S. (1996). Stages of Reading Development. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Bruce.
Chomsky, N. (1995). Language and nature. Mind 104, 1–61. doi:
10.1093/Mind/104.413.1
Coch, D. (2010). “Constructing a reading brain,” in Mind, Brain, and Education:
Neuroscience Implications for the Classroom, ed. D. A. Sousa (Bloomington, IN:
Solution Tree Press), 139–162.
Cole, P. (1970). An adaptation of group dynamics techniques to foreign language
teaching. TESOL Q. 4, 353–360. doi: 10.2307/3585766
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J., and Dolan, R. J. (2001). Neural activity in the
human brain relating to uncertainty and arousal during anticipation. Neuron
29, 537–545. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(01)91735-5
Dehaene, S. (2009). Reading in the Brain: The Science and Evolution of a Human
Invention. New York, NY: Viking Press.
Dekker, S., Lee, N. C., Howard-Jones, P., and Jolles, J. (2012). Neuromyths in
education: prevalence and predictors of misconceptions among teachers. Front.
Psychol. 3:429. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00429
Devonshire, I. M., and Dommett, E. J. (2010). Neuroscience: viable applications in
education? Neuroscientist 16, 349–356. doi: 10.1177/1073858410370900
Feyerabend, P. (1962). “Explanation, reduction, and empiricism,” in Scientific
Explanation, Space, and Time, eds H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minneapolis Press).
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., and Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete coding of reward
probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons. Science 299, 1898–1902. doi:
10.1126/science.1077349
Fodor, J. (1997). Special sciences: still autonomous after all these years. Nous 31,
149–163.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 377
fpsyg-07-00377 March 14, 2016 Time: 17:46 # 11
Horvath and Donoghue A Bridge Too Far – Revisited
Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working
hypothesis). Synthese 28, 97–115. doi: 10.1007/BF00485230
Gaab, N., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Deutsch, G. K., Tallal, P., and Temple, E. (2007).
Neural correlates of rapid auditory processing are disrupted in children with
developmental dyslexia and ameliorated with training: an fMRI study. Restor.
Neurol. Neurosci. 25, 295–310.
Gibbons, P. (2002). Scaffolding Language, Scaffolding Learning: Teaching Second
Language Learners in the Mainstream Classroom. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Gleitman, L. (1990). The structural sources of verb meanings. Lang. Acquis. 1, 3–55.
doi: 10.1207/s15327817la0101_2
Goswami, U. (2006). Neuroscience and education: from research to practice? Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 7, 406–413. doi: 10.1038/nrn1907
Gouin, F. (1892). The Art of Teaching and Studying Languages. Longmans: Green
& Company.
Gresham, G. E., Alexander, D., Bishop, D. S., Giuliani, C., Goldberg, G.,
Holland, A., et al. (1997). Rehabilitation. Stroke 28, 1522–1526. doi:
10.1161/01.STR.28.7.1522
Grezes, J., and Decety, J. (2001). Functional anatomy of execution, mental
simulation, observation, and verb generation of actions: a meta-analysis.
Hum. Brain Mapp. 12, 1–19. doi: 10.1002/1097-0193(200101)12:1<1::AID-
HBM10>3.0.CO;2-V
Hamblin, J. L., and Gibbs, R. W. (1999). Why you can’t kick the bucket as you
slowly die: verbs in idiom comprehension. J. Psycholinguist. Res. 28, 25–39. doi:
10.1023/A:1023235403250
Hook, C. J., and Farah, M. J. (2013). Neuroscience for educators: what are
they seeking, and what are they finding? Neuroethics 6, 331–341. doi:
10.1007/s12152-012-9159-3
Howard-Jones, P. (2011). Toward a science of learning games. Mind Brain Educ. 5,
33–41. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-228X.2011.01108.x
Howard-Jones, P. A. (2014). Neuroscience and education: myths and messages.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 15, 817–824. doi: 10.1038/nrn3817
Howard-Jones, P., Holmes, W., Demetriou, S., Jones, C., Tanimoto, E.,
Morgan, O., et al. (2015). Neuroeducational research in the design and
use of a learning technology. Learn. Media Technol. 40, 227–246. doi:
10.1080/17439884.2014.943237
Huneman, P. (2008). Emergence and adaptation. Minds Mach. 18, 493–520. doi:
10.1007/s11023-008-9121-7
Johnson, S. (2002). Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and
Software. Sammerav, NSW: Simon & Schuster.
Kaschula, R. O. C., Druker, J., and Kipps, A. (1983). Late morphologic
consequences of measles: a lethal and debilitating lung-disease
among the poor. Rev. Infect. Dis. 5, 395–404. doi: 10.1093/clinids/
5.3.395
Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philos. Stud. 95, 3–36. doi:
10.1023/A:1004563122154
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago press.
Mazzocchi, F. (2008). Complexity in biology: exceeding the limits of
reductionism and de using complexity theory. EMBO Rep. 9, 10–14. doi:
10.1038/sj.embor.7401147
McCabe, S. E., Knight, J. R., Teter, C. J., and Wechser, H. (2005). Non-medical
use of prescription stimulants among US college students: prevalence and
correlates from a national survey. Addiction 100, 96–106. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-
0443.2004.00944.x
Murphy, T. H., and Corbett, D. (2009). Plasticity during stroke recovery:
from synapse to behaviour. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 861–872. doi: 10.1038/
Nrn2735
Nicholas, H., and Lightbown, P. M. (2001). Recasts as feedback to
language learners. Lang. Learn. 51, 719–758. doi: 10.1111/0023-8333.
00172
Oberheim, E., and Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2009). “The incommensurability of
scientific theories,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta.
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu
Oppenheim, P., and Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis.
Minn. Stud. Philos. Sci. 2, 3–36.
Ozcelik, E., Cagiltay, N. E., and Ozcelik, N. S. (2013). The effect of uncertainty
on learning in game-like environments. Comput. Educ. 67, 12–20. doi:
10.1016/j.compedu.2013.02.009
Pascual-Leone, A., Horvath, J. C., and Robertson, E. M. (2012). “Enhancement
of normal cognitive abilities through nonivasive brain stimulation,” in
Cortical Connectivity, eds R. Chen and J. C. Rothwell (Berlin: Springer),
207–249.
Pasquinelli, E. (2012). Neuromyths: why do they exist and persist? Mind Brain
Educ. 6, 89–96. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-228X.2012.01141.x
Pavé, A. (2006). “Biological and ecological systems hierarchical organisation,”
in Hierarchy in Natural and Social Sciences, ed. D. Pumain (Dordecht, ND:
Springer).
Pickering, S. J., and Howard-Jones, P. (2007). Educators’ views on the
role of neuroscience in education: findings from a study of UK and
international perspectives. Mind Brain Educ. 1, 109–113. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
228X.2007.00011.x
Pinel, P., Dehaene, S., Riviere, D., and LeBihan, D. (2001). Modulation of parietal
activation by semantic distance in a number comparison task. Neuroimage 14,
1013–1026. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0913
Price, G. R., Holloway, I., Rasanen, P., Vesterinen, M., and Ansari, D.
(2007). Impaired parietal magnitude processing in developmental
dyscalculia. Curr. Biol. 17, R1042–R1043. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.
10.013
Rohrlich, F. (2004). Realism despite cognitive antireductionism. Int. Stud. Philos.
Sci. 18, 73–88. doi: 10.1080/02698590412331289260
Rosenberg, A. (1994). Instrumental Biology, or the Disunity of Science. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Samuels, B. M. (2009). Can the differences between education and neuroscience
be overcome by mind, brain, and education? Mind Brain Educ. 3, 45–55. doi:
10.1111/j.1751-228X.2008.01052.x
Santoro, R., Ruggeri, F. M., Battaglia, M., Rapicetta, M., Grandolfo, M. E.,
Annesi, I., et al. (1984). Measles epidemiology in Italy. Int. J. Epidemiol. 13,
201–209. doi: 10.1093/Ije/13.2.201
Savignon, S. J. (1991). Communicative language teaching: state-of-the-art. TESOL
Q. 25, 261–277. doi: 10.2307/3587463
Schultz, W. (2006). Behavioral theories and the neurophysiology of reward.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 57, 87–115. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.
070229
Shen, L. X., Fishbach, A., and Hsee, C. K. (2015). The motivating-uncertainty effect:
uncertainty increases resource investment in the process of reward pursuit.
J. Consum. Res. 41, 1301–1315. doi: 10.1086/679418
Simos, P. G., Fletcher, J. M., Bergman, E., Breier, J. I., Foorman, B. R.,
Castillo, E. M., et al. (2002). Dyslexia-specific brain activation profile becomes
normal following successful remedial training. Neurology 58, 1203–1213. doi:
10.1212/WNL.58.8.1203
Sylwester, R. (1986). Synthesis of research on brain plasticity: the
classroom environment and curriculum enrichment. Educ. Leadersh. 44,
90–93.
Szucs, D., and Goswami, U. (2007). Educational neuroscience: defining a new
discipline for the study of mental representations. Mind Brain Educ. 1, 114–127.
doi: 10.1111/j.1751-228X.2007.00012.x
Tahara, M., Takeda, M., Shirogane, Y., Hashiguchi, T., Ohno, S., and Yanagi, Y.
(2008). Measles virus infects both polarized epithelial and immune cells by
using distinctive receptor-binding sites on its hemagglutinin. J. Virol. 82,
4630–4637. doi: 10.1128/Jvi.02691-07
Temple, E., Poldrack, R. A., Salidis, J., Deutsch, G. K., Tallal, P.,
Merzenich, M. M., et al. (2001). Disrupted neural responses to
phonological and orthographic processing in dyslexic children: an fMRI
study. Neuroreport 12, 299–307. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200102120-
00024
Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D. P., Druks, J., Barber, H., and Cappa, S. F. (2011).
Nouns and verbs in the brain: a review of behavioural, electrophysiological,
neuropsychological and imaging studies. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 35, 407–426.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.04.007
Von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton: Princeton university press.
White, R. G., and Boyd, J. F. (1973). The effect of measles on the thymus and other
lymphoid tissues. Clin. Exp. Immunol. 13, 343–357.
Willingham, D. T., and Lloyd, J. W. (2007). How educational theories can
use neuroscientific data. Mind Brain Educ. 1, 140–149. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
228X.2007.00014.x
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 377
fpsyg-07-00377 March 14, 2016 Time: 17:46 # 12
Horvath and Donoghue A Bridge Too Far – Revisited
Wimsatt, W. C. (1994). The ontology of complex systems: levels of organization,
perspectives, and causal thickets. Can. J. Philos. 24(Suppl. 1), 207–274.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Horvath and Donoghue. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 377
